Abstract: This article explores the Chinese cognition of democracy in accordance with ancient Chinese political philosophy and modern constitutional jurisprudence. It argues that the classical Chinese cognition of democracy, i.e., demo-orientation, does not consist of any sense of equality and procedure, by which the Chinese people easily confuse democracy by the people with democracy for the people, thinking that China's democracy subsists when the Chinese Government decides in favour of their interests. Moreover, the lack of sense of procedure produces inadequate means against tyranny, that the Chinese people can either admonish the ruler when he or she is still tolerable, or rebel when he or she is unbearable. Neither means serves institutionally.
I. Introduction
'Chinese characteristics' has become a term commonly used in various fields, especially when China cannot reject a Western value nominally, e.g., democracy, but resists the value substantively. For example, Zheng Yong-Nian asserted in 1999 that 'China needs democratization, but this does not mean that China should follow any single Western model for political democracy', 1 which implies that he saw China disagree with the definition of democracy in the West, but cannot deny the spirit of democracy the entire world is pursuing. Before the communist took the helm in 1949, Mao Zedong forcefully asserted on 12 June 1944 that the Chinese people needed electoral democracy with freedom of speech, publication and association because China's greatest defect lay in the lack of genuine democracy; 2 and the editorial of the Xinhua Daily on 17 May 1944 held that 'democracy was firstly developed in a specific country per se, but it is universal and can be applied in any country '. 3 It is therefore puzzling 4 what should be understood by the Chinese people as democracy in the context of Chinese political culture. This article aims to answer this question from the perspective of legal and political philosophy.
We all know that China is often described as a country with a 5000-yearold civilisation. 5 It has developed an independent philosophy supporting its political system, 6 though the system is indeed autocratic. 7 However, the ancient Chinese thinkers, including Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, had constructed a theory of good governance, persuading the Chinese rulers into making decisions for the people. 8 But why has China remained autocratic? In other words, why has the Confucian philosophy of demoorientation (Min-Ben) failed?
We disagree with opinions supporting Confucianism as an antidemocracy philosophy, 9 but we affirm that it lacks two major democratic elements: a sense of equality 10 and procedure. 11 In substance, we argue that Chinese demo-orientation does not embody solid sense of equality, owing to which the importance of democracy by the people is still not broadly appreciated by the Chinese people. As a result, they confuse making decisions for the people with making decisions by the people, thinking that China's democracy subsists when the Chinese Government decides in favour of their interests. In procedure, we assert that the Chinese demo-orientation provides only two inadequate means -either to admonish the ruler when he or she is still tolerable, or to rebel when he or she is unbearable. 12 Neither means serves institutionally, at least not adequately. In other words, we do not accuse Confucianism of breeding autocracy; we argue that it is just not good enough from the perspective of modern democracy.
II. Historical insights
In 1046 BCE, Jizi presented King Wu of Zhou with the Chinese Magna (hong) Carta (fan), 13 whose Preamble reads, 'Hong-Fan was recorded as a result of the return of Jizi, when King Wu of Zhou defeated the Shang dynasty, causing the death of King Zhòu of Shang but granting a peerage to [King Zhòu's son], Wu-Geng'. 14 This passage is usually skimmed over when people study Hong-Fan as a source of the Chinese concept of 'mandate of heaven'; 15 however, if we read between the lines, the Preamble actually hints that the political ground of discussing the mandate of heaven claimed by the Zhou Kingdom, i.e., why the Zhou dynasty could legitimately replace the Shang dynasty, 16 arose from the fact that 'King Wu of Zhou defeated the Shang dynasty '. 17 According to Hsu Cho-Yun, 'the concept of the Mandate of Heaven [was] developed in the political context of the Zhou expansion'. 18 'The Zhou conquest of Shang … in 1045 B.C. represented at the time perhaps only the replacement -through force of arms -of one local power by another, but for later Chinese it came to illustrate the irrepressible will of Heaven turning its mandate from one state, the rulers of which had grown distant from the people, to another state blessed with virtuous rulers'. 19 In other words, the mandate of heaven was originally a theory which justified Zhou's dominance created by the Zhou people, 20 asserting that 'rulers are empowered by Heaven …. If Heaven is disgusted by immoral behavior or offended by inadequate or improper sacrifices it will transfer the authority to rule to another man.' 21 Nevertheless, ' [o]n those occasions when the ruling imperial Dynasty lost the "mandate of heaven" (legitimate right to rule), the people looked for an individual to arise worthy of Heaven's approval', 22 i.e., rebellion. 23 'Normatively, over two millennia this was the method most favoured by the Chinese people for the resolution of crises concerning political legitimacy'. 24 Hence, when we think it through, the mandate of heaven can be understood from two perspectives. First, the transfer of the mandate of heaven can be proved only by a successful rebellion or revolution, 25 otherwise it would be hard to imagine how the dethroned ruler could be compelled into accepting that the mandate of heaven had been transferred. 26 In King Wen of Zhou's Victory against Li, Shang Book of the Book of Documents, 27 King Zhòu of Shang said that he was born to enjoy the mandate of heaven, so he rejected Zu Yi's advice of not being an abusive ruler 28 -he was not aware of the transfer of the mandate of heaven until 'King Wu of Zhou defeated the Shang dynasty' 29 per se. 30 Second, even if we have no doubt that a ruler will behave properly to avoid being overthrown, 31 as long as he remains the person with a lifelong mandate of heaven, he still enjoys full discretion in administration, 32 engendering power imbalances between the ruler and the ruled, 33 by which any attempt to restrict the power of the person with the mandate of heaven is finite -if he is chosen by heaven, how can people disagree with him where there is no obvious right or wrong but only preferences? When his decision is not doomy, why will people bear the risk of rebelling against him? Moreover, why did rebellion become historically inevitable from time to time in China 34 as a non-institutional mechanism and a de facto threat to political stability in order to ensure the rulers with the mandate of heaven behave properly? Lastly, is this political system democratic?
When '[w]e hold [this] truth[] to be self-evident that all men are created equal', 35 our belief logically 36 implies that both mandate of heaven 37 from the East and Dieu et mon droit 38 from the West constitute inequality between the selected few (person or family) and the rest of the people in politics. Hence, Nigel NT Li argues that when it comes to the relationship (li) between the ruler and the ruled, 39 there was no sense of 29 (n 13) (authors' translation). 30 See generally (n 10) 118-19 (indicating that the King Wen of Zhou's Victory against Li shows that the mandate of heaven was a political theory developed by Shang originally, but it was adjusted and modified by the Zhou people in line with their need of a way to justify Zhou overtaking Shang). 31 43 The term ping dung was not employed to represent equality until the late 19 th century. It is not native to the Chinese language and was imported into the language as a translation. Li, as the core of social norms since ancient times China, performed the critical role of distinguishing the nobility, civilians and slaves, as well as guan xis [relationships] so that social/political hierarchy may be established. 44, 45 In other words, when read together, Zhang Qianfan and Nigel NT Li illuminate why China finds democracy difficult to appreciate from a historical perspective. The concept of the mandate of heaven narrowed the Chinese political system to an unequal system, 46 in which the ruler and the ruled are not one, 47 because 'parents' and 'children' can never switch positions, 48 so that the law in line with Confucianism 'sanctioned the doctrine of superiority of the father, the husband and the senior over the son, the wife and the junior respectively'. 49 Hence, where the 'Li' governing 40 See generally (n 10) 3-186 (indicating that equality, if anything foreign to Confucianism, is not at all a denial of the significance of human relationships, but a new conceptual element to, at least some of the social bonding, such as the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, that traditional Confucianism emphasises as not ignorable by the individual human being for a peaceful living in the world). 41 45 (n 44) 265-6 (explaining that the term ping dung was initially created for the use of translation of Buddhism, which implies the concept of equality in afterlife, and so remained mainly a term of religious nature without carrying any secular meaning to affect or to challenge the ideological foundation of Confucianism in prevailing social, ethical and political norms). 46 See generally (n 10) 99-186. 47 Compare Magna Carta (1215) with United States Declaration of Independence (1776) (providing that the consent of the governed is indispensable). 48 53 Nevertheless, Zhang Qianfan has keenly asserted that 'the classical ideas about human dignity require the establishment of a constitution …'. 54 We would like to further point out that the core of constitutionalism does not rest on whether 'the classical ideas about human dignity' 55 are constitutionalised. Many constitutions are not functioning. Hence, we pay more attention to the variables that guarantee the implementation of a constitution, and we hold that both equality and an institutional mechanism are essential.
III. Literature review
More than a decade ago, in a liber amicorum in honour of Professor and Justice Herbert Han-Pao Ma, Nigel NT Li published an essay containing various interpretations on the Chinese cognition of democracy in accordance with China's ancient constitutionalism. 56 The essay is titled 'The First Exploration of the Concept of the "People's Parent" and the 50 (n 10) 3-8. 51 Cf (n 41) 199 (arguing that 'the classical ideas about human dignity require the establishment of a constitution'). 52 (n 41) 200 . 53 See <https://ctext.org/shiji/ru-lin-lie-zhuan/zh> (implying the Chinese logic since the Grand Historian Sima Qian that a ruler is a tyrant when a revolution against him is successful). 54 (n 41) 199. Ancient Confucian Constitutionalism: From Shanghai Museum Bamboo Slips', 57 in which Li analyses how the Chinese people understand the modern concept of democracy 58 in accordance with 59 Richard Sheridan and Abraham Lincoln's famous words, i.e. 'government of the people, by the people, for the people', 60 holding that either there is no concept of democracy but only the ideal of enlightened despotism in China, 61 or the Chinese concept of democracy consists only of democracy of the people as well as for the people, but not by the people. 62 Li states:
Many academics held that the ancient Confucianism does not consist of the concept of democracy, but only the concept of demo-orientation. For example, Ambrose Y.C. King stands in line with the Japanese sinologists, holding that demo-orientation can only constitute enlightened despotism. However, K.C. Hsiao held that China's demo-orientation consists only of democracy of the people and for the people, but not by the people, by which the crucial distinction between demo-orientation and democracy can be explained. Both are outstanding theories. Moreover, [I think] that another distinction between demo-orientation and democracy is a matter of equality, that democracy is a political structure which supposes that all men are created equal, whereas demo-orientation exists for the people communicating with their own rulers. 63 Li's criticism has enlightened David KC Huang, who formularises the political ground of Taiwan's judicial supremacy in his PhD thesis titled 'Judicial Supremacy in Taiwan 58 (n 10) 42-5. 59 See also Constitution of R.O.C. section 1 (1947) (stipulating that '[t]he Republic of China … shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people'). 60 [T]his thesis does not intend to challenge electoral democracy. The intention here is to point out that it is possible for an unelected administrator or judge to obtain democratic legitimacy if his/her decision answers to public interests, and he may be as powerful as elected officials in politics by doing so. This thesis considers that elections provide the fundamental precepts of democracy and does not support the Chinese definition of democracy, i.e. democracy with Chinese characteristics. 71 We find Huang falling into the trap of ancient Chinese political philosophy, though we know where he stands -where Li attempts to distinguish the concept of democracy from that of demo-orientation, Huang perfects the theory of demo-orientation for fear of its being misused by autocracies. 72 In contrast to Li who concludes from the Confucian philosophy that the Chinese difficulty in democratisation lies in the lack of a sense of equality, 73 Huang observes the Chinese poor sense of procedural justice and highlights it as a political ground for demo-orientation. 74 Though we have no intention to discard Huang's subtle theory of demo-orientation for being incorrect, we read the worries in his academic 'disclaimer' 75 and would like to bring the theory to the next stage in which both Li's and Huang's ideas about democracy and demo-orientation can be merged without conceptual contradictions. We would like to build our new theory regarding the distinction between contemporary democracy and the ancient Chinese demo-orientation on the distinction between substantive law and procedural law (Materielles Recht und Verfahrensrecht 76 ) applied permanently in both civil law 77 and common law 78 jurisdictions, and would define the ancient Chinese demo-orientation as a very matter of substantive democracy. However, contemporary democracy is not only a matter of substantive democracy but also a matter of procedural democracy. 79 In other words, we agree with the Chinese concept that democracy for the people, i.e. demoorientation, is the substance of democracy; but we also agree with the Western model that democracy by the people denotes the necessary procedure of democracy. Though we do not deny that the ancient Confucian philosophy pursues a core value of democracy, namely for the people, it is obvious that the Chinese philosophy provides a poor mechanism for it. 80 Nevertheless, we take the view that only a combination of the substance and procedure will lead to genuine democracy of the people, and that is the ultimate form of government for all humankind.
We are aware of the present Chinese democracy with Chinese characteristics promoted in China, 81 79 For example, we consider the pursuit of human rights a form of substantive democracy. However, it is obvious that the contemporary Western democracy rests on the pursuit of procedural democracy and we particularly appreciate this character. 80 See generally (n 10) 9-55. 81 with the Chinese public interests, this does not change the fact that such a demo-oriented decision has been made in the absence of the democratic consent -public opinion is not a proper procedure. Moreover, we would not identify such a decision-making system as a political system that embraces a true sense of equality. 84 Hence, we would not hold that there is sensible democracy with Chinese characteristics; there is only Chinese demo-orientation when their government decides in accordance with the Chinese public interests. 85 An applicable analogy would be a political system that treats the people like juveniles without capacity 86 in politics, where decisions shall be made for the good of all the Chinese people without their consent. 87 At the same time, we may agree with the argument that procedural democracy cannot guarantee substantive democracy in toto, 88 but we stand in line with Sir Winston Churchill, holding that 'democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others forms that have been tried from time to time'. 89 In other words, we are not going to 'pretend[] that democracy is perfect or all-wise', 90 but we do believe that procedural democracy is one of the most important mechanisms of democracy that cannot be wiped out. Our argument is simple: if procedural democracy cannot guarantee substantive democracy in toto, neither can enlightened despotism or democracy with Chinese characteristics. 91 Moreover, we are not convinced why a political system with a democratic procedure is inferior to one without a democratic procedure in pursuit of democracy 92 -that is just illogical. Hence, even if we agree with the demo-orientation concept that originated in the Chinese philosophy and proposed by the People's Republic of China, we are not certain about its feasibility in carrying out true democracy for the people. 84 See generally (n 10) 38-54. 85 Compare (n 10) 38-54 with (n 64) 59-67. 86 92 Cf JL Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (Mercury Books, London, 1961) 1-13; contra (n 88) 90 (indicating that 'China's supporters say it has learned responsiveness and self-correction better than Western democracies'). In a nutshell, our new theory distinguishes the ancient Chinese demoorientation from contemporary Western democracy through two crucial characters: equality 93 and democratic procedure. 94 We do agree that both demo-orientation and democracy pursue democracy for the people, but we find both have different attitudes towards equality and mechanism, that demo-orientation consists of inequality in politics and autocracy as the mechanism, whereas democracy embraces both equality and a democratic procedure. Accordingly, we do not deem genuine redefined democracy with Chinese characteristics as Ambrose YC King has put so well, it is a modern Chinese version of enlightened despotism 95 that has claimed to be a democracy. Moreover, we value our ancestors' political thoughts regarding demo-orientation, with which Mencius indicated that democracy for the people shall be a moral obligation of the rulers; 96 but we must also admit that our ancestors provided us with not only an ineffective mechanism for China's democracy, but also a political philosophy that tolerates inequality. 97
IV. Methodology
This article rests on contemporary constitutional jurisprudence mainly developed as a notion foreign to traditional Chinese thought, analysing why China finds democracy as defined by the West 98 difficult to appreciate through a critical review of the concept of demo-orientation, which is of Chinese origin, to reveal that democracy is different from demoorientation in democracy's embrace of equality and procedure/institutional mechanism. There may be other differences between democracy and demo-orientation -we have no doubt -but they are beyond the scope of this article.
In addition, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) has been signed by 169 countries around the world, showing that not only China but also other 168 countries have pursued a policy 93 (n 10) 45-49. 94 See generally (n 83) 3-9. 95 of developing socioeconomic well-being, and many of them are also the signatories of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) . In other words, the pursuit of socioeconomic well-being as human right, such as Elizabeth J Perry argues preferably, 99 does not, however, necessarily exclude the pursuit of political equality and procedure. As a matter of fact, when Jürgen Habermas analyses a welfare state, he considers electoral democracy as a prerequisite. 100 Nevertheless, whether the pursuit of socioeconomic well-being shall be conducted first or not is beyond the scope of this article too.
V. Demo-Orientation: The substance
The king is like a boat and his subjects the water. The water that bears the boat is the water that sinks the boat. 101 -Xunzi (313-238BCE) Demo-orientation is the ancient Chinese ideal political system promoted by the Confucian school. 102 Its Mandarin pronunciation is 'Min-Ben'; and literarily it 'means treating "people" (min) as "roots" (ben)'. 103 According to Baogang Guo, Min-Ben 'can be translated as "regarding the people as the roots of the state" or simply "put the people first"'. 104 Many contemporary Chinese political scientists consider demo-orientation as the Chinese model of democracy; 105 however, Maestro Sa Meng-Wu not only disagreed but also held that demo-orientation consists only of democracy for the people but not democracy of the people and by the people, 106 by which demo-orientation can never be read as a form of democracy.
The people are superior to the spirits of the land and grain, but the king is inferior to both the people and the spirits of the land and grain. Hence to gain the people is the way to be crowned, to please the king is the way to become a feudal lord, [and] to serve the lords is the way to be knighted. When a lord dares to blaspheme against the spirits of the land and grain, he shall be attaindered; when the sacrifices to the spirits of the land and grain are held properly and punctually but drought or flood still ensues, [the people] shall worship other spirits. 107 -Mencius (372-289BCE) Almost every scholar referring to the concept of demo-orientation begins with the above quote from Chapter Jin-Xin II of Mencius, 108 the classical Four Books. 109 The first sentence, i.e., 'The people are superior to the spirits of the land and grain, but the king is inferior to both the people and the spirits of the land and grain', 110 is commonly quoted in support of the Chinese cognition of democracy. 111 The original term, 'She Ji', is more often translated as 'the state', 112 though its literal meaning is 'the spirits of the land and grain'. 113 The above quote was very avant-garde when Mencius said it more than 2300 years ago, because he intended to link up a feudal ruler's moral responsibility with democracy for the people, so he defined the order of legitimacy of both the feudal rulers and states (or the spirits of the land and grain) in line with his thought of demoorientation and placed the people as the ultimate goal. 114 In other words, we consider Mencius' demo-orientation a remarkable achievement, because he actually demanded that feudal rulers and states (or even spirits) take political responsibility for people's welfare more than 2300 years ago. He even said: [ Nevertheless, when we recall pre-Mencius literature regarding demoorientation, it appears that demo-orientation may not necessarily link to the people directly, as it did not even justify citizens' revolutions. 116 Unlike Mencius, who legitimised citizens' revolution, demo-orientation in pre-Mencius times was no more than political advice suggesting that the Chinese feudal rulers make demo-oriented decisions in order to avoid an aristocratic revolution. Here are some examples: [Our] We find no sense of equality in the ideal of demo-orientation 120 in toto in pre-Mencius times. In the Song of the Five Princes, Xia Book of the Book of Documents, 121 the first prince recalled an admonition regarding demoorientation from his royal ancestor, Yu the Great, concluding with sorrow that the throne of his brother was taken away by another noble family because the people did not care. 122 In Guanzi, i.e., the Analects of Guan Zhong, 123 Guan Zhong expounded on how to build a superpower in accordance with demo-orientation; 124 however, in contrast to Rule Britannia, in which the British people proudly chant 'Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves! And Britons never never never shall be slaves', 125 we still find no sense of equality in Guan Zhong's proposal. 126 Of course, these Chinese thinkers were all proto-democratic thinkers living more than 2000 years ago; we cannot blame them for not possessing any sense of equality. However, we must state clearly that it is not appropriate to apply their theories without modern sophistication accordingly, because we do not live in the ancient world, and equality is morality in our epoch. 127 Mencius was a (proto-)democratic thinker, as is often claimed. Living in the ancient feudal world, Mencius never challenged the existing social distinction between the aristocratic class and the laypeople. In fact, he (and all other Confucians including Confucius) never questioned the moral legitimacy of the monarchical system even if he believed the ideal way to transmit the throne was by abdication. 128 Though we do not blame these ancient Chinese thinkers for lacking a sense of equality, we hold that the methods they proposed for implementing demo-orientation are either inadequate or incompetent from the perspective of modern constitutionalism. 129 Due to the lack of a sense of equality, these thinkers 'highlighted the need for interaction between the rulers and the ruled' 130 as the main and only method for demo-orientation because 'demo-orientation [by its nature] is a dialogue between Confucianism and monarchy. It functions as a [moral] writ, that the people can plead for mercy … . It does not change the [absolute] monarchy'. 131 In other words, demo-orientation is not a legal right (subjektives Recht 132 ) but only a reflex of interest (Reflexrecht 133 ) in accordance with German jurisprudence; or by English jurisprudence, it is not a right but the Royal Prerogative. 134 However, we found that ancient Chinese demo-orientation lies in the theory of the 'People's Parents', 135 which is obviously the Chinese version of reflex of interest or royal prerogative.
The King is graceful and humble, [and he shall behave like] the people's parent. 136 -The Book of Poetry (1046-771BCE) The concept of the king as the people's parent originated 137 in the Book of Poetry, 138 and it has been figuratively transformed into the Confucian ideal of good governance, and the image of great ruler has been shaped accordingly. 139 In Shanghai Museum Bamboo Slips, Confucius enlightened Zixia on the concept of the king as the people's parent, in which Confucius listed the terms by which a king can be honoured as the people's parent. 140 That is, the original concept of the king as the people's parent should be an honour the king has to earn, according to Confucius, 141 but this concept also implies not only hierarchy (paternalism 142 ) but also inequality (dualism between the ruler and the ruled 143 ) because parents and children can never switch positions. 144 It is even more problematic when the concept is applied unfairly, where the rulers claim powers and rights as the people's parents without taking the corresponding responsibilities. 145 Unfortunately, we learn from history that it happens all the time:
Why China finds it difficult to appreciate democracy 349 When the positions of the rulers and the ruled are solidified like parents and children in politics, there will be more structural problems. Firstly, when a ruled subject makes a request to the ruler like a child making a request to the parent, it implies that there are no 'rights' but only 'favours' within, 147 because there were no children's rights in pre-modern China. 148 Hence, there were no civil rights in pre-modern China 149 accordingly. Secondly, it is immoral to accuse parents of incompetence or evil in Chinese culture. 150 When the concept of the king as the people's parent is applied, it becomes difficult to accuse the ruler of tyranny. 151 That is to say, though the Confucian thinkers attempted to build up a model of good governance through the concept of the people's parent, the concept can lead to only one right the Chinese people actually have for thousands of years, i.e. the right of rebellion, 152 which is the worst democratic 'procedure' we have ever known.
The Chinese people have no right of legislation, they have no right of self-taxation, they have not the power of voting out their rulers or of limiting or stopping supplies. They have therefore the right of rebellion. Rebellion is in China the old, often exercised, legitimate, and constitutional means of stopping arbitrary and vicious legislation and administration. 153 Maestro Liang Shuming, a Mongol-Chinese philosopher and sinologist, criticised the classical Chinese political civilisation of inadequacy, 155 because 'the Chinese people had attempted to institutionalise their democracy of the people and for the people, but never considered democracy by the people such as voting or representative democracy as an institutional method'. 156 Liang satirised this as a 'Chinese cultural characteristic' 157 in 1949, and he even remarked that 'democracy defined by the East' 158 will be proposed in contrast to 'democracy defined by the West'. 159 However, we appreciate Liang's idea because he exposed the weakness of China's classical demo-orientation -China 'never considered democracy by the people such as voting or representative democracy as an institutional method'. 160 Democracy comes from Greek, 161 i.e. δημοκρατία, which means 'direct rule by the people'. 162 Hence, it is not so much a substantive concept as a procedural or methodological means 163 in accordance with its literal construction. In contrast with demo-orientation, which is originally a descriptive term profiling a substantive concept, i.e., 'treating "people" (min) as "root" (ben)', 164 democracy emphasises the procedure, where a decision shall be made by the people 165 more than made for the people.
In other words, decision made for the people is only the logic extension 166 (goal) of democracy, but not its intension 167 (definition). Unlike demoorientation, which describes decision made for the people as its definition, 168 demo-orientation is logically impossible to be read as a form of democracy, so that there is no democracy with Chinese characteristics per se.
When we juxtapose demo-orientation with democracy, we wonder whether any institutional method or due procedure exists. David KC Huang argues in his PhD thesis regarding judicial supremacy that public opinion can construct indirect democratic legitimacy for unelected judges, by which an indirect enforcement mechanism proposed by George Vanberg 169 can be developed as a method. 170 However, when we read Huang's definition regarding public opinion, that it 'represents political pressure from the public as it is received or inferred by the Justices in their examination of how the decision-making process influences eventual result', 171 it becomes clear that this is not an effective institutional method or due procedure if it is applied beyond the judicial power, because an indirect enforcement mechanism, such as Georg Vanberg says, will simply be ineffective if the public is unaware of the situation. 172 Accordingly, Huang, like Vanberg, never agrees that this mechanism can replace electoral democracy -with his academic 'disclaimer', Huang indicates that he has no intention at all to 'challenge electoral democracy'. 173 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that China's common cognition of democracy is not so much democracy as demo-orientation, though it is often claimed to be democracy, 174 because democratic procedure in China's decision-making process does not exist. 175 The Chinese people often confuse making decision for the people with that of by the people, thinking that China's democracy subsists when the Chinese Government decides in favour of their interests. 176 As far as we are concerned, such misunderstanding is rooted in the Chinese poor sense of procedure, 177 because of which the Chinese people find it culturally difficult to distinguish demo-orientation from democracy -'as long as the result was favourable, there was no need to care about procedural details'. 178 We can also read this unique phenomenon through David KC Huang, who published an essay regarding China's constitutionalism with an articulate profile of the Chinese poor sense of procedure in politics. 179 Huang writes:
The Chinese people traditionally accept a regime being established by military force, as long as thus regime rules righteously afterwards. The Chinese people traditionally have a poor sense of procedural justice, and thereby, they easily become realists in politics -the one who de facto controls China is already the ruler of China, and any debate referring to the process as well as methodology reverse nothing in politics.
[…] It is not the constitutional legal procedure (democratic procedure) that matters; it is about who can really control the whole of China that matters. 180
VII. Democracy: Substance Is Rooted in Procedure
For it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. 181 -Sir William Blackstone (1768) We quote this 'settled and invariable principle in the laws of England' 182 and make our argument accordingly: what are supposed to be the remedy and redress of demo-orientation except rebellion 183 when the ruler refuses to comply with the Confucian political ideal of the people's parent in accordance with the ancient thinkers? The truth is perhaps brutal -no remedy or redress because it is not binding in China. 184 Hence, demoorientation as far as we are concerned cannot be read as China's constitutional law in accordance with Blackstone, 185 though we can concede that it is part of the Chinese constitutionalism in ancient times.
The Blackstone quote embodies the spirit of substance being rooted in procedure, 186 by which we can distinguish political institution from political theory, where political institution subsists when a ruler is obliged to comply; vice versa, political theory guides the ruler when he or she is willing to be enlightened. However, when we examine democracy and demo-orientation together, we find democracy as Western constitutionalism is based upon various procedural means, such as election, 187 rule of law 188 and the separation of powers framework. 189 On the other hand, it is embarrassing that demo-orientation, which is supposed to be China's constitutionalism, 190 provides only two inadequate means -either to admonish the ruler 191 when he or she is still tolerable, or to rebel 192 when he or she is unbearable. Neither means serves institutionally, as seen in Maestro Liang Shuming's criticism, in which he critically diagnosed this phenomenon as a symptom in the Chinese civilisation 193 in 1949. Liang said:
In my opinion, democracy in China is nothing more than an ideal, but it is an institution in the West. When it is an ideal, it is not legally binding even if it is obviously just -it is wise but impracticable. When it becomes an institution, it is legally binding even if it merely constructs a simply rule -it is direct and practicable. 194 -Liang Shuming (1949) If we were to take the perspective of the Chinese rulers, we would surely find demo-orientation not attractive 195 because making decisions for the people lies in their choice, not a legal duty. 196 In contrast to Western political history, European rulers from Charles I of England, 197 Louis XVI of France, 198 to Prince Klemens von Metternich 199 on behalf of Ferdinand I of Austria, also found making decisions for the people unattractive when they were not bound to do so. As a matter of fact, King John of England was compelled to ratify the Magna Carta 200 in 1215; however, in 1046BCE, Jizi presented King Wu of Zhou with the Chinese Magna (hong) Carta (fan) because Jizi considered King Wu of Zhou a good king. 201 In other words, England's first constitution already qualified as a court enforceable institution the king must comply with, but China's first constitution remained an ideal that only the good kings are entitled to learn. 202 The lack of institutionalisation in Hong-Fan, the Magna Carta of China, had resulted in different consequences in contrast to England, where the English Magna Carta has built up England's democracy with law. 203 But Hong-Fan as China's Magna Carta has built up China's demo-orientation only with mercy. 204 We appreciate the wisdom and contribution of these ancient Chinese thinkers to democracy, but the deficiencies in their theories are clear -even democracy for the people is mercy instead of right; 205 History indicates that the short-lived blueprint of China's first and last modern constitutional monarchy 208 had the tacit approval of the Empress Dowager Cixi because of the above quotation, 209 and it is said that the Empress Dowager Cixi was rendered speechless when Li Hong-Zhang proclaimed himself an insurrectionist. 210 For thousands of years, 'the Chinese typically did not consider themselves "Chinese" so much as "civilized", equating Chinese culture with civilization'; 211 however, we sincerely admit China's classical demo-orientation to be unsatisfactory as a modern means of democracy because of two missing components: a sense of equality 212 and procedure. 213 In substance, 214 Chinese demo-orientation does not comprise any sense of equality, by which the importance of democracy by the people is still not broadly appreciated by the Chinese. As a result, they confuse making decisions for the people with making decisions by the people, thinking that China's democracy subsists when the Chinese Government decides in favour of their interests. In procedure, 215 Chinese demo-orientation provides only two inadequate means -either to admonish the ruler when he or she is still tolerable, or to rebel when he or she is unbearable. Neither means serves institutionally from the perspective of modern democracy.
We do not criticise ancient Chinese thinkers for those limitations. On the contrary, we admire and cherish their wisdom, insight and contribution. However, we blame ourselves if we are not nanos gigantum humeris insidentes and do not develop our democracy per aspera ad astra -we admit them to be deficiencies because we aim for democracy as much as those ancient thinkers did. 214 See generally (n 78) 55-7. 215 Ibid. 
